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Competitive Equilibrium with Generic Budgets: Beyond Additive
Moshe Babaioff∗ , Noam Nisan† , Inbal Talgam-Cohen‡
Abstract
We study competitive equilibrium in the canonical
Fisher market model, but with indivisible goods.
In this model, every agent has a budget of artifi-
cial currency with which to purchase bundles of
goods. Equilibrium prices match between demand
and supply—at such prices, all agents simultane-
ously get their favorite within-budget bundle, and
the market clears. Unfortunately, a competitive
equilibrium may not exist when the goods are in-
divisible, even in extremely simple markets such
as two agents with exactly the same budget and a
single item. Yet in this example, once the bud-
gets are slightly perturbed—i.e., made generic—a
competitive equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. In
this paper we explore the extent to which generic
budgets can guarantee equilibrium existence (and
thus related fairness guarantees) in markets with
multiple items. We complement our results in
[Babaioff et al., 2019] for additive preferences by
exploring the case of general monotone prefer-
ences, establishing positive results for small num-
bers of items and mapping the limits of our ap-
proach. We then consider cardinal preferences, de-
fine a hierarchy of such preference classes and es-
tablish relations among them, and for some classes
prove equilibrium existence under generic budgets.
1 Introduction
We study the notion of competitive equilibrium in markets of
indivisible goods without money, in which players have pos-
sibly very different budgets of artificial currency. Such mar-
kets capture real-life allocations such as courses to students,
shifts to workers, scientific resources within a university, and
even food donations among food banks. A competitive equi-
librium is a fundamental concept in microeconomics, formal-
izing a steady-state of the market in which prices balance
between the agents’ demand for the goods, and the supply
of goods on the market. Such an equilibrium has recently
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been shown to imply attractive fairness guarantees among
players with different entitlements for the indivisible goods
[Babaioff et al., 2019]. Our goal is to identify conditions for
equilibrium existence by considering generic budgets.
Motivation 1: Equilibrium existence.
A fundamental achievement of Arrow and Debreu’s 1954
general equilibrium theory in microeconomics is establish-
ing the existence of a competitive equilibrium under mini-
mal conditions on the market. In an equilibrium, goods are
assigned prices, each agent takes her preferred set of goods
among the sets that are within her budget, and the market
clears. The resulting allocation is Pareto efficient by the first
welfare theorem.
Once there are indivisible goods on the market, equilibrium
existence is no longer guaranteed. In this paper we focus on
the simple Fisher market model [Brainard and Scarf, 2005]
with m goods and n agents (buyers) endowed with posi-
tive amounts of artificial currency in the form of budgets
b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bn (the artificial currency has no use outside the
market). Each agent has a preference order among all possi-
ble bundles of goods. The only divergence from the classic
model is that goods are indivisible. To see that an equilib-
rium need not exist, consider a single indivisible item sold to
two agents with the same budget of 1. If the item’s price is at
most 1, both agents desire it (note that since there is no value
for money, an agent is not satisfied if the price is 1 but she
doesn’t get the item). If the price is strictly above 1, neither
agent can afford it and the market doesn’t clear.
Our starting point is that this simple nonexistence exam-
ple is a knife-edge phenomenon: if the budgets are 1 + ǫ
and 1 for any ǫ > 0 instead of precisely equal, an equilib-
rium does exist (by setting the item price to be in between the
two budgets). To avoid this knife-edge case, Budish [2011]
initiated the study of equilibria with almost-equal budgets
(he also relaxed market clearance and allowed extra copies
of certain items, which the current paper does not). In this
paper we take the notion of almost-equal budgets one step
further—we consider generic budgets, i.e., arbitrary budgets
(possibly far from equal) to which tiny random perturbations
have been added,1 as a tool to establish existence of compet-
1A more formal way to define generic budgets is as those which
do not satisfy a few simple equalities like b1 = b2 (see Section 2;
see also the “Generic property” page in Wikipedia).
itive equilibrium beyond the single-item case. While generic
budgets do not ensure equilibrium existence in every mar-
ket model,2 in our model there is evidence that genericity
can vastly enlarge the set of markets in which an equilibrium
exists. Anecdotal evidence gathered from computer simula-
tions and real-life data suggests that existence in our model
is quite common with generic budgets. In particular, a com-
puterized search we ran over small (two-agent) markets with
generic budgets produced no non-existence examples; simi-
larly, a simple taˆtonnement process we applied always found
an equilibrium in larger, real-life markets from the Splid-
dit website [Goldman and Procaccia, 2014]. This motivates
seeking a finer understanding of conditions under which equi-
librium existence is guaranteed in Fisher markets with indi-
visible goods and generic budgets.
Motivation 2: Fairness under different entitlements.
Which allocations of goods among agents deserve to be called
“fair”? A vast literature is devoted to this question (e.g.,
[Brams and Taylor, 1996; Brandt et al., 2016]). Many stan-
dard notions of fairness in the literature reflect an underlying
assumption that all agents have an equally-strong claim to the
goods. However, some agents may be a priorimuch more en-
titled to the goods than others [Robertson and Webb, 1998].
Examples include partners who own different shares of
the partnership’s holdings [Cramton et al., 1987], differ-
ent divisions sharing a company’s computational resources
[Ghodsi et al., 2011], or family members splitting an heir-
loom [Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1990]. Despite many applica-
tions, there is almost no literature on fair division of indivis-
ibles among agents with different entitlements.3 Our model
perfectly captures these situations, since the entitlement of
agent i can be modeled by her budget bi (we may assume
wlog that
∑
i bi = 1).
Babaioff et al. [2019] generalize to unequal entitle-
ments a classic approach from fair allocation with equal
entitlements—finding a competitive equilibrium from equal
incomes (CEEI). They treat entitlements as budgets, and
show that any competitive equilibrium (from unequal in-
comes) in the resulting Fisher market has compelling fairness
guarantees. In particular, an equilibrium allocation ensures a
natural generalization of themaximin share guarantee arising
from the well-known cut-and-choose protocol.4 Establishing
equilibrium existence thus guarantees the existence of a fair
2For example, in the quasi-linear model, alongside the indivis-
ible goods there is a single infinitely divisible item that plays the
role of money. When budgets are sufficiently large that they are
effectively unlimited, this coincides with the combinatorial auction
setting, in which market equilibrium existence is guaranteed only
for gross substitutes preferences [Gul and Stacchetti, 1999].
3Since in our model utility is non-transferable and money has
no intrinsic value, there can be no interpersonal comparison of
preference—see Section 1.1. Thus, notions of fairness like maxi-
mizing Nash social welfare are inappropriate in our setting.
4For every agent i ∈ [n] and any rational number ℓ/d ≤ bi,
agent i is guaranteed to get at least as much as she can by parti-
tioning the items into d bundles and taking the worst ℓ out of d.
Farhadi et al. [2017] independently study a different fairness notion
for allocation among unequals, which is unrelated to competitive
equilibrium (and in particular not guaranteed to exist for 3 items).
allocation among unequals. On the flip side, non-existence of
equilibrium due to indivisibility is to be expected, as indivis-
ibility undermines the ability to fairly allocate.
If we slightly perturb the budgets representing entitle-
ments to ensure equilibrium existence, the fairness guarantees
shown by Babaioff et al. [2019] change only slightly. In other
words, if we can establish existence of a competitive equilib-
rium by making the budgets generic, we get almost the same
fairness guarantees. Thus, a better understanding of compet-
itive equilibrium with generic budgets can help reach fair or
approximately fair division of indivisible items among agents
with heterogeneous entitlements.
1.1 Our model
Consider a market setting with n budgeted agents N . Un-
less stated otherwise assume
∑
i bi = 1. Each agent i has
an ordinal preferencei over all subsets of them indivisible
items M . We use S i T to denote that i weakly prefers
the set T over the set S, and S ≺i T to denote that i strictly
prefers T over S, meaning that S i T and T i S. When
S i T and T i S we say that i is indifferent between
S and T , and denote this by S =i T . We assume through-
out that every preference i is monotone, i.e., S i T for
every S ⊂ T .5 For example, if we are allocating three
items {A,B,C}, a possible preference of agent i might be
∅ i {A} i {B} i {A,B} i {C} i {B,C} i
{A,C} i {A,B,C}. We say that a preference is strict if
there is never an indifference between sets, that is, for every
two sets S 6= T it holds that either S ≺i T or T ≺i S.
We also consider cardinal preferences represented by a
valuation function vi : 2
M → R≥0, which assigns to ev-
ery bundle S a nonnegative value vi(S). Wlog, vi(∅) = 0.
Since money in our model is artificial, it cannot be used as
a yardstick against which to measure and compare different
agents’ preferences, so vi(S) should not be interpreted as
an absolute amount by which agent i values bundle S. We
say that an ordinal preference i is represented by a car-
dinal valuation vi if S i T ⇐⇒ vi(S) ≥ vi(T ) and
S ≻i T ⇐⇒ vi(S) > vi(T ).
A competitive equilibrium consists of a pair: a price vec-
tor p = (p1, . . . , pm), and an allocation (partition) S =
(S1,S2, . . . ,Sn) of all the items among the agents. By def-
inition, an allocation is feasible (no item is allocated more
than once) and market clearing (every item is allocated). Let
p(S) =
∑
j∈S pj . We say that S is within budget bi if
p(S) ≤ bi, and that S is demanded by agent i at prices p
if S is the most preferred bundle within her budget at these
prices (i.e., p(T ) > bi for every T that i strictly prefers to S).
Using this terminology:
Definition 1.1 (CE). A competitive equilibrium (CE) is a pair
(S, p) of allocation S and item prices p, such that Si is de-
manded by agent i at prices p for every i ∈ N .
(Note that Definition 1.1 does not include a condition of
market clearance as an allocation is always a full partition.)
5Monotonicity is natural in most applications
[Bouveret et al., 2016] and is the standard assumption in the
quasi-linear model. For one exception see [Budish, 2011].
1.2 Our results
In this section we give an overview of our results, us-
ing as a reference point the quasi-linear (combinatorial
auctions) model for which CE existence is well-studied
and well-understood (see Footnote 2 above; see also
[Blumrosen and Nisan, 2007]). In contrast, the Fisher model
we focus on here has not been studied much, possibly since
the nonexistence for single item settings was deemed a non-
starter.
General ordinal preferences.
Our results on the existence of a CE with generic budgets for
general preferences can be summarized as follows.
Theorem (Informal). A CE with generic budgets always ex-
ists in markets with: (i) at most 3 items and any number of
agents; or (ii) 4 items and 2 agents. On the other hand, there
exists a market with 5 items and 2 agents such that for an
open interval of budgets, no CE exists.
The above theorem implies that generic budgets can be a
useful way of expanding the realm of markets for which a CE
exists (recall that without generic budgets a CE is not guar-
anteed even with 1 item). The existence results for markets
with few items are surprising in comparison to quasi-linear
settings, in which a CE may fail to exist even when there are
only 2 indivisible items and 2 agents. However, the theorem
rules out a “sweeping” existence result that holds for every
single market. In Section 3 we further rule out the possibil-
ity that the fundamental second theorem of welfare holds for
general preferences. This motivates our focus on non-general
classes of preferences in the next sections.
Our theorem leaves open the case of 4 items and more than
2 agents. In follow-up work, Segal-Halevi [2018] introduces
a new technique that settles this open question, showing guar-
anteed existence for 4 items and 3 agents, and demonstrating
possible non-existence for 4 items and 4 agents.
Leveled preferences.
As we have seen, generic budgets show promise for estab-
lishing CE existence, but general preferences turn out to be
too general when there are many items. We demonstrate how
genericity can guarantee existence of CE for any number of
items by focusing on a natural subclass of preferences.
Definition 1.2. A monotone preference is leveled if for ev-
ery two bundles S, T such that |S| > |T |, S ≻ T .
That is, an agent with a leveled preference strictly prefers
any large bundle to any small one, and among bundles of the
same cardinality any preference ordering is feasible. This
type of preference fits many real-world settings. One example
is two political parties with different numbers of supporting
voters (different entitlements) and the allocation of ministe-
rial positions among them [Brams and Kaplan, 2004]. The
parties often care most about the number of positions they
get, and as a secondary consideration about the type of po-
sitions.6 This example also nicely demonstrates that generic
6As a second example consider the allocation of offices among
two departments at a university: each department first cares about
the number of offices it receives, and as a secondary consideration
about which offices, their precise shapes, etc.
budgets are often an accurate model for reality, as it is un-
likely that the number of supporting voters determining the
entitlements will belong to the zero-measure set for which a
CE does not exist.
In Section 4 we establish our main existence result for the
class of leveled preferences:
Theorem (Informal). In markets with 2 agents, leveled pref-
erences and arbitrary budgets, for any small enough pertur-
bation of the budgets, a competitive equilibrium exists.
Other classes of preferences.
Looking forward, in order for future work to map the lim-
its of the generic budget approach for establishing CE ex-
istence, it must systematically explore relevant preference
classes. In combinatorial auctions, a similar exploration of a
hierarchy of valuation classes, developed in seminal work by
Lehmann et al. [2006], has been the central driving force of
the literature for the past decade. The hierarchy in the quasi-
linear model consists of additive, substitutes, submodular,
XOS, subadditive, limited-complements and finally general
valuations (with strict inclusion among these classes). There
is typically a sharp dichotomy between limited-complements
and fully-general valuations in terms of equilibrium existence
etc.
With this in mind, our final goal is to establish a
parallel hierarchy of preference (rather then valuation)
classes, including well-studied classes from the literature
[Brandt et al., 2016]. Surprisingly, our main finding is that
the second-highest class in the hierarchy before fully-general
preferences is preferences representable by submodular val-
uations! (In the quasi-linear world submodular valuations
are relatively low in the hierarchy.) We conclude that in the
no-money model, submodular preferences already represent
a large chunk of the most relevant preferences for positive
results, including all strict preferences and even preferences
that correspond to valuations with complements.
We now describe the hierarchy: For every type of prefer-
ence (like additive) we denote in capitals its corresponding
class. GENERAL is the class of all monotone ordinal pref-
erences. A preference is submodular if it can be represented
by a submodular valuation v: for every two bundles S, T ,
v(S)+ v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪T )+ v(S ∩T ). A preference is lexico-
graphic if there exists a strict preference ≻∗ over items such
thatS ≻ T ⇐⇒ max≻∗{s ∈ S\T } ≻∗ max≻∗{t ∈ T \S}.
I.e., the most preferred item in S \ T is preferred over the
most preferred item in T \ S (this trivially holds if T \ S is
empty). Intuitively, an agent with a lexicographic preference
would trade all of her items for a single higher-ranked item.
The remaining definitions as well as the proof establishing
the following strict hierarchy are deferred to Section 5:
LEXICOGRAPHIC ( ADDITIVE
( RESPONSIVE ( SUBMODULAR ( GENERAL .
(We remark that the class of leveled preferences is incompa-
rable with the classes in the hierarchy below GENERAL, in
the sense that none of these classes contains the other.)
To state our result for SUBMODULAR, we need the fol-
lowing definition (see Section 5). We say that a monotone
preferencei satisfies satiation-only-at-the-top (and belongs
to class SATIATED-AT-TOP) provided that if item j adds
nothing to a given set T , it also adds nothing to any superset
of T . This is quite a weak condition, satisfied in particular by
any strict monotone preference. We show:
Theorem (Informal). The class SUBMODULAR is equal
to SATIATED-AT-TOP.
The above thus gives a complete characterization of mono-
tone ordinal preferences that can be represented by submod-
ular valuations.
Returning to the question of generic CE existence, in Sec-
tion 5 we establish this for LEXICOGRAPHIC. The class
ADDITIVE has been considered in [Babaioff et al., 2019;
Segal-Halevi, 2018], and the state-of-the-art is positive re-
sults for 2 additive agents with additional conditions; remov-
ing these conditions (and extending to RESPONSIVE and
beyond) is currently the central open question in this line of
work.
1.3 Additional related work
Our model is a special case of Arrow-Debreu ex-
change economies with indivisible items. Sev-
eral other variants have been studied. The
line of work originating with [Svensson, 1983;
Maskin, 1987] (see [Niazadeh and Wilkens, 2016] for a
recent example) considers markets with indivisibilities in
which an infinitely divisible good plays the role of money.
The line of work originating with [Shapley and Scarf, 1974;
Svensson, 1984] focuses on the house allocation prob-
lem. Several works assume a continuum of agents like
[Mas-Colell, 1977], and/or study relaxed CE notions like
[Rastogi and Cole, 2007]. Closest to ours are the model
of combinatorial assignment [Budish, 2011], which allows
non-monotonic preferences, and the model of linear mar-
kets [Deng et al., 2003], which crucially uses non-generic
budgets.
Budish [2011] circumvents the non-existence of a CEEI
due to indivisibilities by weakening the equilibrium con-
cept (relaxing market clearance and sometimes requiring
more copies of certain items). His work focuses exclu-
sively on budgets that are almost equal. In the same model,
Othman et al. [2016] show PPAD-completeness of comput-
ing an approximate CEEI as well as other hardness re-
sults. The preferences used in the hardness proofs are non-
monotone, leading Othman et al. to suggest restricting the
preferences (as we do here) as a way around their nega-
tive results. Braˆnzei et al. [2015] study the existence of ex-
act CEEI for two valuation classes (perfect substitutes and
complements) with non-generic budgets. Recent independent
work by Barman et al. [2018] uses CEs in Fisher markets as
a tool to achieve a different fairness guarantee than ours—
(approximate) envy-freeness rather than (generalized) max-
imin share guarantees—for additive preferences.
1.4 Organization
Section 2 contains several preliminaries, Section 3 includes
our results for general ordinal preferences, and Section 4
presents our existence result for leveled preferences. Section
5 presents classes of preferences and their hierarchy.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we formally define budget-exhausting prices,
Pareto optimality and welfare theorems, and generic budgets.
Given budgets b and an allocation S, we say that prices p
are budget-exhausting if p(Si) = bi for every agent i. Note
that if p is budget-exhausting then every agent is allocated,
i.e., Si 6= ∅ for every i (since bi > 0). We observe that
budget-exhaustion is wlog when every agent is allocated (this
will come in handy in Section 3):
Claim 2.1 (Budget-exhausting prices are wlog). For every
CE (S, p) such that Si 6= ∅ for every i ∈ N , there exists a CE
(S, p′) in which p′ is budget-exhausting.
Proof. As every agent is allocated at least one item, we can
raise the price of that item in her allocated bundle until her
budget is exhausted. The new prices form a CE with the
original allocation since every agent still gets her demanded
set.
The next definition formulates what it means in our model
for an allocation (CE or otherwise) to be “efficient” (since we
are in a non-transferable-utilitymodel (no-money), maximiz-
ing welfare i.e. the sum of agents’ values, is irrelevant):
Definition 2.2 (PO). Consider a market with preferences
{vi}i∈N . An allocation S is Pareto optimal (a.k.a. Pareto
efficient or PO) if no allocation S ′ dominates S, i.e., if for
every S ′ 6= S there exists an agent i for whom Si ≻i S ′i.
PO plays a role in two kinds of fundamental welfare the-
orems in economics, which apply to various market models
and equilibrium notions. The first is known to apply to CEs
in our setting:
Theorem 2.3 (First welfare theorem). Let (S, p) be a CE.
Then S is PO.
To discuss the second welfare theorem we use the follow-
ing terminology: Given a market with preferences {i}i∈N
and budget profile b, an allocation S is supported in a CE
if there exist item prices p such that (S, p) is a CE. Where
only preferences are given, we say S is supported in a CE if
there exist prices p and budgets b such that (S, p) is a CE. The
second welfare theorem, where it holds, states that every PO
allocation is supported in equilibrium. In Section 3 we refute
this fundamental theorem for the basic Fisher model. I.e., we
show there are some socially-efficient allocations which can-
not be realized in equilibrium even if the social planner has
the power to set the budgets as she desires.
Generic budgets (versus different budgets).
We are interested in showing generic existence of a CE for
classes of markets. We use the standard notion of genericity,
i.e., “all except for a zero-measure”, or equivalently, “with
tiny random perturbations”. By generic existence we thus
mean that for every market in the class, for every vector of
budgets except for a zero-measure subset, a CE exists. An
equivalent way to say this is: for every market in the class,
for every vector of budgets, by adding tiny random pertur-
bations to the budgets we get a new instance in which a CE
exists with probability 1.
A useful way of specifying a zero-measure subset of bud-
gets is as those which satisfy some condition, for instance,
b1 = 2b2. The conditions we use differ among different CE
existence results, and for concreteness we shall list them ex-
plicitly within each result; we emphasize however that the
conditions themselves are irrelevant to our contribution, as
long as the measure of budgets satisfying them is zero.
Generic budgets are not to be confused with different (or
arbitrary) budgets, by which we mean budgets that are not
necessarily equal or almost equal to one another.
3 General preferences
In this section we prove our results for general ordinal mono-
tone preferences. We begin with two existence results.
Proposition 3.1 (2 or 3 items). Consider n ≥ 2 agents with
monotone preferences over m ≤ 3 items, and budget profile
b. If b1 > b2 > b3 ≥ 0 (where b3 = 0 if n = 2), then a CE
exists.
Proof. For 2 items, the following is a CE: let agent 1 pay b1
(the highest budget) for his most preferred item, and let agent
2 pay b2 (the second-highest budget, strictly lower) for the
remaining item.
For 3 items, first observe that in any CE, an agent whose
budget is not among the three highest will remain unallocated.
We proceed by case analysis:
• If b1 > 3b2, then agent 1 gets all 3 items, each for a price
of b1/3 > b2.
• If 3b2 ≥ b1 > 2b2, then agent 1 gets the bundle of size 2
that he most prefers, and pays b1/2 > b2 for each item,
and agent 2 gets the remaining item for price of b2.
• If 2b2 ≥ b1 > b2+b3, then if the pair of items that agent
1 prefers most does not contain agent 2’s most preferred
item, give agent 1 this pair and charge him b1/2 for each
item, and give agent 2 the remaining item for price b2.
Otherwise, give agent 2 his second most preferred item
for a price of b2, give the other 2 items to agent 1 and
charge him b2 + ǫ > b2 for agent 2’s most preferred
item, and b1 − b2 − ǫ > b3 for the other item.
• If b1 = b2 + b3, then if there is an item that agent 1
prefers over all pairs of items, he gets the item and pays
his budget, while each other agent – in the order of their
budgets – picks his most preferred item and pays his
budget. If there is no such item, agent 2 gets his most
preferred item for price b2, and agent 1 get the remain-
ing 2 items, each for a price of b1/2 < b2.
• If b2+b3 > b1 > b2, then each agent in the order of bud-
gets picks his most preferred item out of the remaining
items, paying his budget.
It is not hard to verify that each of these price vectors indeed
form a CE for the given budgets.
Proposition 3.2 (4 items). Consider n = 2 agents with
monotone preferences over m = 4 items, and budget profile
b. If b1 /∈ {4b2, 3b2, 3b2/2}, then a CE exists.
Proof. Denote the items by {A,B,C,D}. We partition the
space of budgets by the ratio of b1 and b2 as follows:
• If b1 > 4b2: Price every item at b1/4 and give all items
to agent 1.
• If 4b2 > b1 > 3b2: Give agent 1 the bundle of size 3
that he most prefers, and price each item at b1/3. Give
the leftover item to agent 2 at price b2.
• If 3b2 > b1 > 3b2/2: See Claim 3.3.
• If 3b2 > b1 > 3b2/2: See Claim 3.4.
Claim 3.3. A CE exists if 3b2 > b1 > 3b2/2.
Proof of Claim 3.3. If agent 1 prefers any triplet of items to
any pair, then give agent 2 the item that he most prefers
at price b2, and give agent 1 the remaining triplet at price
b1/3 per item. Otherwise assume without loss of general-
ity that {A,B} is agent 1’s most preferred pair. If agent 1
prefers {A,B} only to one triplet, without loss of generality
{B,C,D}, then there are three cases:
• Case 1: Agent 2’s favorite item is not A. Give agent 2
the item that he most prefers at price b2, and give agent
1 the remaining triplet at price b1/3 per item.
• Case 2: Agent 2 prefers {C,D} to {B}. If b1 > 2b2,
give agent 1 the pair {A,B} and agent 2 the pair {C,D}.
Set the prices to be (b1 − b2 + ǫ, b2 − ǫ, b2/2, b2/2).
Otherwise if b1 ≤ 2b2 set the prices to be (b2 + ǫ, b1 −
b2 − ǫ, b2/2, b2/2).
• Case 3: Give agent 1 the triplet {A,C,D} and agent 2
the item B. Set the prices to be (b2 + ǫ, b2,
b1−b2−ǫ
2 ,
b1−b2−ǫ
2 ).
Assume now agent 1 prefers {A,B} to both {A,C,D}
and {B,C,D}. If b1 > 2b2, then give agent 1 the pair
{A,B} and give agent 2 the pair {C,D}. Set the prices to
be (b1/2, b1/2, b2/2, b2/2). Otherwise 2b2 ≥ b1 and there
are two cases:
• Case 1: Agent 2 prefers {C,D} to {A} or to {B}; as-
sume without loss of generality the latter. Then give
agent 1 the pair {A,B} and give agent 2 the pair {C,D}.
Set the prices to be (b2 + ǫ, b1 − b2 − ǫ, b2/2, b2/2).
• Case 2: Agent 2 prefers {A} and {B} to {C,D}. As-
sume without loss of generality that agent 1 prefers
{A,C,D} to {B,C,D}. Give agent 1 the triplet
{A,C,D} and give agent 2 the item B. Set the prices to
be (b2 + ǫ, b2,
b1−b2−ǫ
2 ,
b1−b2−ǫ
2 ).
This completes the proof of Claim 3.3.
Claim 3.4. A CE exists if 3b2/2 > b1 > b2.
Proof of Claim 3.4. Without loss of generality let A be the
single item most preferred by agent 2. Let δ = b1 − b2.
• Case 1: The complement to a pair that agent 1 prefers
over {B,C,D} appears before A in agent 2’s prefer-
ence ordering. Give agent 1 the most preferred such pair,
which must include A by monotonicity, and give agent 2
its complement.
– Subcase (i): Agent 1 gets his most preferred pair.
Set the prices to be b1/2, b1/2 for agent 1’s items,
and b2/2, b2/2 for agent 2’s items.
– Subcase (ii): Agent 1 gets his second most pre-
ferred pair, without loss of generality {A,C}where
the most preferred pair is {A,B}. This means that
{C,D} appears after {A} in agent 2’s preference
ordering. Set the prices to be (b1 − b2/2, b2/2 +
ǫ, b2/2, b2/2− ǫ), where ǫ < δ.
– Subcase (iii): Agent 1 gets his third most preferred
pair, without loss of generality {A,D} where the
first and second most preferred pairs are {A,B},
{A,C}. This means that {C,D} and {B,D} ap-
pear after {A} in agent 2’s preference ordering. Set
the prices to be (b1/2 + δ, b2/2, b2/2, b1/2− δ).
• Case 2: agent 1 prefers {A} over {B,C,D}. Give agent
1 the item A and give agent 2 the bundle {B,C,D}. Set
the prices to be (b1, b2/3, b2/3, b2/3).
• Case 3: Give agent 1 the bundle {B,C,D} and give
agent 2 the item A.
– Subcase (i): Agent 1 has one pair preferred over
{B,C,D}, without loss of generality {A,B}. This
means that {C,D} appears after {A} in agent 2’s
preference ordering. Set the prices to be (b2, b1 −
2ǫ, ǫ, ǫ), where δ/2 < ǫ < δ.
– Subcase (ii): Agent 1 has two pairs preferred over
{B,C,D}, without loss of generality {A,B} and
{A,C}. This means that {C,D} and {B,D} ap-
pear after {A} in agent 2’s preference ordering. Set
the prices to be (b2,
b1−ǫ
2 ,
b1−ǫ
2 , ǫ), where ǫ < δ.
– Subcase (iii): Agent 1 has three pairs preferred
over {B,C,D}, these pairs are {A,B}, {A,C}
and {A,D}. This means that {C,D}, {B,D} and
{B,C} appear after {A} in agent 2’s preference or-
dering. Set the prices to be (b2, b1/3, b1/3, b1/3).
This completes the proof of Claim 3.4.
Combining Claim 3.3 with Claim 3.4, Proposition 3.2 fol-
lows.
We now switch to negative (i.e. non-existence) results,
which we prove via the next example. The example is in-
spired by a classic CE non-existence result in the completely
different model of quasi-linear utilities (combinatorial auc-
tions), where one agent (Alice) treats two items as comple-
ments and another (Bob) as substitutes. The three extra items
help adapt the example to our no-money model.
Example 3.1 (2-player 5-item market with no CE). Let agent
1 be Alice and let agent 2 be Bob. Denote the items by
A,B,C,D,E. The ordinal preferences are induced by car-
dinal values as follows. For the first two items, Alice and
Bob have different perspectives. Alice values item A at 10
and item B at 20, and the pair at 700. Bob has a value of
500 for A and 501 for B, and a value of 502 for both. Both
Alice and Bob have additive preferences over the three items
C,D and E, valuing them at 201, 202 and 203, respectively.
For both agents, the value of a set is additive across the pair
{A,B} and the three remaining items; for example, if Alice
gets {A,B,C,D} her value is 700 + 201 + 202 = 1103.
Theorem 3.5 (5 items). There exist monotone strict prefer-
ences for 2 agents over 5 items such that for any budget pro-
file b satisfying (4/3)b2 > b1 > b2, no CE exists.
Theorem 3.6 (No second welfare theorem). There exist
monotone strict preferences for 2 agents over 5 items, and
a PO allocation S, such that S is not supported in a CE for
any budget profile b.
The proofs of Theorems 3.5 and 3.6 rely on the following
key lemma (Theorem 3.6 follows from it immediately):
Lemma 3.7. Let S be any allocation in Example 3.1 in
which Alice gets an item X1 ∈ {A,B} and items Y1, Y2 ∈
{C,D,E}, Y1 6= Y2, and Bob gets the remaining items
X2 ∈ {A,B} and Y3 ∈ {C,D,E}. Then S is PO, and
not supported in a CE for any budget profile b.
Proof. Allocation S is PO since both Alice and Bob preferB
over A, and both have the same preference order over items
C, D and E. Thus there is no exchange of items that im-
proves the situation for both agents simultaneously. Assume
for contradiction that S is supported in a CE. Since both Al-
ice and Bob prefer Alice’s bundle {X1, Y1, Y2} over Bob’s
bundle {X2, Y3}, to support S in a CE it must be the case
that b1 > b2. By Claim 2.1 we may assume both agents
exhaust their budgets, and so b1 = pX1 + pY1 + pY2 and
b2 = pX2 + pY3 . In such a CE, since Alice prefers re-
placing X1 by Y3 and replacing {Y1, Y2} by X2, it must be
that pX1 < pY3 and pY1 + pY2 < pX2 . This implies that
b1 = pX1+pY1+pY2 < pX2+pY3 = b2, a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. By the first welfare theorem (Theorem
2.3), to show that no CE exists we only need to consider PO
allocations. By strict monotonicity, every item is allocated.
By Claim 2.1 we can further assume that if there were a CE,
then both players would exhaust their budgets. We begin by
observing that since Alice has more money, it is not possible
that Bob gets both A and B – Alice can afford Bob’s bun-
dle, and she prefers {A,B} over {C,D,E}. On the other
hand, Alice cannot get {A,B} or any superset of it. This is
because in such a CE one of the items A or B will have price
at most b1/2 < b2, and Bob prefers that item over any pair
of items from his set, and there is such a pair that costs at
least (2/3)b2 > b1/2, thus Bob will deviate. We are left to
consider the case that Alice gets one of A and B, and Bob
gets the other. If Alice also gets all three items in {C,D,E},
the allocation is not PO as it is dominated by giving Alice the
set {A,B} and Bob the rest. If Alice gets at most one of the
items in {C,D,E}, she would rather exchange bundles with
Bob, and can afford it, so it is not a CE. If Alice gets one of
A or B, and two items from the set {C,D,E}, Lemma 3.7
rules out the existence of a CE, completing the proof.
4 Leveled preferences
In this section we prove that leveled preferences ensure
generic CE existence for 2 agents. This is in contrast to the
quasilinear (combinatorial auctions) model.7
Theorem 4.1. Consider n = 2 agents with leveled prefer-
ences over m items, and budget profile b. If mb1 is not an
integer then a CE exists.
Proof. Let p∗ = 1/m, k1 = ⌊mb1⌋ and k2 = ⌊mb2⌋. In-
tuitively, p∗ is the “fair” price for an item, and k1, k2 are
the target number of items to allocate to each agent in or-
der to achieve budget-proportionality. By assumption,m · b1
is not an integer and so k1 + k2 = m − 1. By definition,
b1/k1 > p
∗ > b1/(k1 + 1), and b2/k2 > p
∗ > b2/(k2 + 1).
Assume wlog that b1/(k1+1) > b2/(k2+1) (the analysis
of the complementary case is similar and is omitted for space
considerations). Give agent 2 her most preferred set of k2
items, and agent 1 the remaining k1 + 1 items. Price each of
agent 1’s items at b1/(k1 + 1), and each of agent 2’s items at
b2/k2.
We argue that no agent wishes to deviate: Agent 1 would
only want to deviate to a bundle with ≥ k1 + 1 items, but
all such bundles are above her budget—she is currently ex-
hausting her budget with items priced b1/(k1 + 1), and all
other items cost b2/k2 > p
∗ > b1/(k1 + 1). Agent 2 gets
her most preferred set of k2 items, so would only want to de-
viate to a bundle with > k2 items, but all such bundles are
above her budget – item prices are at least b1/(k1 + 1) >
b2/(k2 + 1).
5 A hierarchy of preferences
In this section we explore the hierarchy of preference classes
presented in Section 1:
LEXICOGRAPHIC ( ADDITIVE (1)
( RESPONSIVE ( SUBMODULAR ( GENERAL .
We first fill in the missing definitions and prove the hierar-
chical relations in (1). We then characterize the hierarchy’s
next-to-final level and show generic CE existence for its first
level (in fact, the same argument establishes existence for
unit-demand valuations).
ADDITIVE is the class of preferences that can be rep-
resented by an additive valuation, where a valuation v is
additive if v(S) =
∑
j∈S v({j}) for every bundle S.
RESPONSIVE is the class of preferences satisfying the fol-
lowing definition:
Definition 5.1. A monotone ordinal preference  is respon-
sive if there exists a preference ∗ over items such that
∀S, ∀j, j′ /∈ S, it holds that S∪{j}  S∪{j′} ⇐⇒ j ∗ j′
and S ∪ {j} ≻ S ∪ {j′} ⇐⇒ j ≻∗ j′.
7If agent 1 has values (2, 2, 2) for bundles (A,B,AB) over 2
items, and agent 2 has values (0, 0, 3) for these bundles, then the
valuations represent leveled preferences but one can verify that with
quasilinear utilities a CE does not exist.
Intuitively, an agent with a responsive preference would
always trade a lower-ranked item for a higher-ranked one.
Responsive preferences arise naturally in the matching liter-
ature. For example, consider a hospital that ranks individual
doctors based on their test scores, then the hospital’s prefer-
ence over sets of doctors will be responsive to its preference
over individuals.
Proposition 5.2. The strict inclusion relations in (1) hold.
Proof. For simplicity of exposition we show the inclusions
for strict preferences; indifferences do not change the rela-
tions.
• LEXICOGRAPHIC ( ADDITIVE. Let ≺ be any
preference in LEXICOGRAPHIC induced by a pref-
erence ≺∗ over items. Wlog assume 1 ≺∗ 2 ≺∗
· · · ≺∗ m. Define an additive valuation v in which
item j has value 2j−1 (larger than the total value of
all items ranked lower than j). Observe that v repre-
sents the preference ≺. Thus LEXICOGRAPHIC ⊆
ADDITIVE, and it is not hard to see there are prefer-
ences in ADDITIVE \LEXICOGRAPHIC.
• ADDITIVE ( RESPONSIVE. It is not hard to see
that ADDITIVE ⊆ RESPONSIVE; we now construct
a preference in RESPONSIVE \ADDITIVE. Let ≻
be a preference in RESPONSIVE induced by the pref-
erence A ≻∗ B ≻∗ C ≻∗ D ≻∗ E over items.
The preference ≻∗ over items induces a partial order
over bundles of the same cardinality. For bundles of
size 2, we know that either AB ≻ AC ≻ BC ≻
AD ≻ BD ≻ CD ≻ AE ≻ BE ≻ CE ≻ DE,
or AB ≻ AC ≻ BC ≻ AD ≻ BD ≻ AE ≻
CD ≻ BE ≻ CE ≻ DE. However, ≻∗ does not
induce an order over bundles of different cardinalities,
which may be arbitrary subject to monotonicity. We may
thus assume that both AD ≻ BCD and BCE ≻ AE,
without violating the responsiveness or monotonicity of
preference≻. Now assume for contradiction that prefer-
ence ≻ is represented by an additive valuation v. Then
AD ≻ BCD =⇒ v(A) > v(BC), but BCE ≻
AE =⇒ v(BC) > v(A), contradiction.
• RESPONSIVE ( SUBMODULAR ( GENERAL.
It is not hard to see there are preferences
in GENERAL \ SUBMODULAR and in
SUBMODULAR \RESPONSIVE.
Submodular preferences.
A well-known condition on preferences required by general
equilibrium theory is non-satiation: for every set T and item
j /∈ T , it holds that T ≺ T ∪ {j} (stated otherwise, every set
is strictly preferred over any of its subsets). For example, a
strict monotone preference clearly satisfies non-satiation. We
now weaken this condition: a monotone preference i satis-
fies satiation-only-at-the-top when for every set T ⊂ S and
item j /∈ S, if T =i T ∪ {j} then S =i S ∪ {j}. That is,
if given a set T , agent i gains nothing by adding item j /∈ T ,
then she also gains nothing by adding item j to any superset
of T (if the preference is satiated for item j at set T then T is
“at the top”). We denote by SATIATED-AT-TOP the class
of preferences that satisfy the weakened condition. One ex-
ample of such preferences is those arising from unit-demand
valuations,8 or similarly from strict preferences over items
but with several substitutable copies of every item. As an-
other example, consider the preference represented by valua-
tion v(∅) = 0 < v({A}) = v({B}) = 1 < v({A,B}) = 10.
While items A,B are complements in this valuation, it satis-
fies non-satiation and thus also satiation-only-at the-top.
Theorem 5.3. Every monotone preference  that sat-
isfies satiation-only-at-the-top (or non-satiation) can
be represented by a submodular valuation; that is,
SUBMODULAR = SATIATED-AT-TOP.
Proof. Index the bundles such that ∅  S1  S2  · · · 
S2m−1 (with any order between bundles for which there is
indifference). The layer l(t) of a set St is defined as follows:
If St = ∅ then its layer is 0. Otherwise it is at layer k > 0 if
there exists a set T ≺ St such that T has layer k−1, and there
is no setX such thatSt ≺ X ≺ T . Define v(St) = 1−2−l(t).
It is not hard to see that v represents.
We now argue that v is submodular, by showing that for
every two sets St ⊂ St′ and item j /∈ St′ it holds that v(j |
St) ≥ v(j | St′). By monotonicity it holds that t′ > t,
v(j | St) ≥ 0 and v(j | St′) ≥ 0. If v(j | St′) = 0 then
clearly v(j | St) ≥ 0 = v(j | St′) as needed. So it remains
to handle the case that v(j | St′) > 0. If l(t) = l(t′) then
v(St′) = v(St) and thus v(j | St′) = v(St′∪{j})−v(St′) ≥
v(St∪{j})−v(St) = v(j | St) by monotonicity. Otherwise,
by monotonicity, l(t′) ≥ l(t) + 1.
Since v(St′) = 1 − 2
−l(t′) and v(St′ ∪ {j}) < 1 we have
v(j | St′) = v(St′ ∪ {j}) − v(St′) < 1 − (1 − 2−l(t
′)) =
2−l(t
′) ≤ 2−(l(t)+1), as l(t′) ≥ l(t) + 1.
Additionally, by satiation-only-at-the-top, as v(j | St′) >
0 it must be the case that v(j | St) > 0. Since v(St) ≺
v(St ∪{j}), the set St ∪{j} is at layer at least l(t)+ 1. Thus
v(j | St) = v(St ∪ {j}) − v(St) ≥ 2−l(t) − 2−(l(t)+1) =
2−(l(t)+1) ≥ v(j | St′), completing the proof.
We observe that the theorem is tight, thus providing a com-
plete characterization of monotone preferences that can be
represented by submodular valuations: if a monotone ordinal
preference violates satiation-only-at-the-top, then item j must
have a positive marginal with respect to some set and a zero
marginal with respect to its subset, violating submodularity.
Lexicographic preferences.
Proposition 5.4. For n agents with lexicographic preferences
and distinct budgets, a CE exists.
Proof. Run the well-known serial dictatorship allocation
protocol (see [Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998]) as fol-
lows: Order the agents by decreasing budget and let each
agent i < n in turn pick her most preferred item among the
unallocated items. Price this item at bi (agent i’s budget). Al-
locate all leftover items to agent n whose budget is smallest,
8A unit-demand valuation assigns a value to each item, and val-
ues every bundle by the highest-valued item within it.
pricing such items at bn/r where r is the number of leftovers.
The resulting allocation and item pricing form a CE.
6 Summary
We view our main conceptual contribution as showing that
to get positive equilibrium existence results (and associated
fairness guarantees) for interesting classes of markets be-
yond additive preferences, it is sufficient to exclude degen-
erate market instances. This is done by adding “small”
noise to the agents’ budgets to make them generic, in the
spirit of smoothed analysis for getting positive computational
tractability results [Spielman and Teng, 2009]. Unlike previ-
ous approaches, there is no need to relax the equilibrium no-
tion, and our model allows for possibly very different bud-
gets. Our approach is shown to work for markets with gen-
eral ordinal preferences and a small number of items, markets
with 2 agents with leveled preferences, and markets with n
agents with lexicographic preferences. We expect additional
classes of markets to be added to this list in the future. To-
wards this end, we explore a hierarchy of preference classes
inspired by the combinatorial auctions literature, and present
a negative result for the highest level of the hierarchy. Further
mapping of the theoretical landscape (for example, exploring
the case of symmetric preferences) remains a promising di-
rection for future research, as well as understanding why and
to what extent generic CE existence is common in practice.
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